Maritime Security on Southeast Asia Through Extra-Regional Cooperative Efforts

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Abstract

The region of Southeast Asia has evolved as a global important maritime region. Despite this, the marine sector in the region continues to be vulnerable due to conflicting maritime border claims, piracy, and other international maritime concerns, among other factors. A regional maritime mechanism and strategic partnership that is inclusive and comprehensive in order to ensure good order at sea are needed. As a means of enhancing marine cooperation, it is essential that handle obstacles and ensure that the strategy is implemented as planned. This article makes extensive use of qualitative methodologies and documents, particularly those pertaining to maritime concerns, in order to describe maritime strategies and their dialogue partners. As a result of this article, many countries have a common interest in maritime security and economic stability, and there is a greater chance for sharing burdens and working cooperatively as a result of this interest among countries.

Keywords— cooperation; maritime; regional; security; southeast asia

I. INTRODUCTION

As the world's largest archipelagic and marine state, Indonesia controls over more than half of Southeast Asia's maritime zones. For various reasons, the massive expanse of ocean that encompasses and surrounds the Indonesian archipelago is vital to the country. The sea serves as a mode of transportation and communication and a significant economic resource. However, the sea may also be a source of vulnerability, a possible highway for criminal activity, and a conduit for smuggling commodities and individuals. Many aspects of maritime security are of concern to the country, mainly because there are ongoing issues with maritime law enforcement and piracy located in the Malacca Straits, the archipelago surrounding the South China Sea and Singapore is a persistent problem, remains a problem for the government.

The necessity and insufficient resources to maintain order and law enforcement have hampered the need to maintain marine security.

Even though Indonesia has a long history of maritime expertise, to gain greater control over sea and ocean resources, the country has worked to master and regulate new technology, despite its ancient naval tradition. The Indonesian Navy recognizes that in terms of both quality and quantity, the country's territorial waters are lacking in defense equipment, facilities, and manpower, resulting from a lack of monitoring and investigative capability throughout the country's jurisdictional waters.

An overview of maritime security is an area of strategic importance to Indonesia, in general, will be presented in this article to identify some of Indonesia's most pressing maritime security challenges. Indonesia's initiatives to work with other nations to secure the troublesome maritime areas are then discussed in this article and possible forums for cooperation with extra-regional states, such as Europe.

II. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Due to growing worldwide worries about maritime security in the 1990s, the idea of Maritime Security emerged in the study of global security. This notion has grown in importance with the advent of terrorism in the early 2000s. Historically, maritime security is a new expression (Chalk, 2010:2), while earlier, maritime security tended to concentrate on conventional features such as sea control and expeditionary operations. Countries in the international system believe that maintaining good order at sea is necessary for its development because, in a non-traditional security approach, the sea is understood not only as an area for securing land but also as a natural resource, transportation route, and essential environmental aspects (Bell & Webster, 2010:24).

The sea, as a transportation channel, is inextricably linked to the movement/migration of goods and people. Because of the absence of numerous official permissions necessary to migrate from one nation to another, maritime migration remains prone to illegal movement (Noonan & Williams, 2016:49). In maritime security, one risk is interwoven with another; for example, people smuggling is susceptible to weapons and drug smuggling. As a consequence, thorough management and legislation are essential to handle maritime security issues (Keliat, 2009:115).

According to Bateman (2016), maritime security has become a vital issue in the previous decade and will continue to evolve. Maritime security has its unique set of issues since it is difficult to define, covers several facets, and is often interdisciplinary. Until now, the scope of maritime security issues has been comprehensive and diverse, ranging from freedom of navigation, safety at sea; natural disaster phenomena at sea such as tsunamis and underwater volcanoes; transnational organized crimes at sea such as piracy, robbery, and various forms of smuggling; to environmental problems such as pollution and irresponsible resource extraction in the sea (Cordner, 2014:47-48).

Although related, the concept of maritime security differs from previous seas' traditional

concepts such as sea power and maritime law; this concept places a greater emphasis on the interconnectedness of threats and problems; generates new forms of governance and policies at sea; and the development of a new capacity-building agenda for maritime security (Amirell, 2016:284). The notion has been enlarged and refined to cover new security challenges impacting many players and multi-sectoral solutions, such as strengthening the link between security and development (Bateman & Bergin, 2011:118).

According to Bueger (2015), maritime security is a keyword that has brought attention to a new set of difficulties and risks in the maritime realm, for which support is being mustered. One may argue that maritime security should simply mean the absence of certain risks in this environment. Bueger, on the other hand, criticizes this method as inadequate. He agrees with proponents of 'good order at sea,' which gives a positive end-state rather than a negative peace, but he does not specify what good order is or whose order it is. Bueger's paper seeks to overcome the lack of agreement by proposing three underlying frameworks from which to begin better understanding maritime security, according to Mudri (2015). Indeed, Bueger (2015) establishes a matrix in which maritime security ties four ideas to one another: the maritime environment, economic development, national security, and human security:

Tabel 1.1 Bueger's Maritime Security Matrix

Source: Bueger (2015)

- The interconnected nature of maritime security challenges;

- The liminality of maritime security – that most maritime security problems cannot be understood or addressed without considering their links to land-based challenges;
- The transnational nature of maritime security given that the sovereignty of the high seas is shared, with jurisdiction there being international in theory, but also varying depending on the given circumstances pertaining;
- That, by extension, the maritime domain is essentially cross-jurisdictional Bueger (2015).

Each state and international player defines maritime security differently, despite the same fundamental aspects. However, the general thrust of the methodology and characterization of individual nations and players is holistic, signifying an endeavor to comprehend and participate in the maritime arena as an interconnected security complex rather than a series of distinct dangers or difficulties (Voyer et al., 2018:2). Because they are interconnected, maritime security becomes a communal concern in the political structure, with no one actor exercising decisive influence when acting alone (Tertia & Perwita, 2018:80).

In accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Law Of the Sea (UNCLOS), peaceful usage of seas is defined as follows. The UNCLOS may be referred to by nation-states, although nation-states pursuing maritime domination tend to disregard the Convention. After that, the sea power idea developed by Alfred T. Mahan became the basis for the strategic thinking of many powerful maritime states, which was explained as follows:

"Control of the sea by maritime commerce and naval supremacy means predominant influence in the world... is the chief among the merely material factors in the power and prosperity of nations" (Mahan, 1918)

In order to create security cooperation in the maritime environment, the terms "maritime security" and "security cooperation framework" were combined. According to David Dewitt, security cooperation must avoid "deterrence" in favor of "assurance," which will lead to a more secure environment within which multilateral frameworks can flourish. However, security interactions would still be important in this environment in helping countries align their national interests and decreasing the risk of a zero-sum security dilemma (Dewitt, 1994). As a foundation for a security cooperation framework, two or more states can agree on a common understanding of certain opponents. In order to improve regional or global security, it may be necessary to implement joint security measures, when they are taken consideration, this notion takes into consideration the existing balance of power order (Dyekman, 2007). Developing a cooperative security system in a multipolar world relies heavily on the contributions of smaller and medium-sized countries (Moodie, 2000).

To accomplish this sort of cooperative security, in order to build the foundations for multilateral security frameworks, security can only be improved if countries work together. In the context of maritime cooperation serves as a conduit between one state's understanding of maritime security and that of other states. The inclusion of security cooperation is envisaged to inspire nation-states to increase their maritime security cooperation in common areas, notwithstanding geopolitical limits. Chris Rahman emphasized the importance of maritime security collaboration in addressing the world's growing number of maritime security problems (Rahman, 2009).

It should also be noted that maritime security is of concern not only to littoral states or the international community at large in terms of access to the sea as a common space, but also to landlocked states, given the transnational nature of threats to the maritime domain, which also meet with land at some point. Furthermore, all countries need commercial access to seaports (Lu, Chang, Hsu, & Metaparti, 2010:664).

Various maritime locations in the Indo-Pacific region have been the subject of the most significant contention, including, the Indian Ocean, the South China Sea, and the East China Sea. Even though there has never been a direct

military confrontation in those places, those locations are the cause of the escalating security dangers in the region, even though no such fight has occurred. Concerns about regional security fuel the conflict over these lands, but the specifics vary greatly from country to country within the region. Furthermore, because such areas are of great geostrategic significance, the disputes have posed a complex problem to ensure the safety of shipping in the Indo-Pacific.

III. METHODS

This article primarily elaborates why the region requires regional maritime cooperation and analyzes the problems that South East Asia must overcome to execute the unity and centrality in promoting maritime cooperation and regional stability that has been established. This article uses qualitative approaches to understand marine strategies and the conversation partners they engage with, and state papers that are particularly relevant to maritime issues.

IV.   DISCUSSION

At a more fundamental level, the perception of danger affects maritime security policies, plans and operations as much as the threat itself. Whether governments, groups, or people, different participants face different political, socioeconomic, and historical realities (Bateman, Ho, & Chan, 2009:4). Different realities maintain or represent different maritime security issues, different "danger" terms of reference, different security enforcement objectives, and different reactions and expectations of cooperative efforts and arrangements. Furthermore, in Asia, governments, not "states" as a whole, are involved in many negotiating procedures regarding maritime jurisdictional rights, dispute resolution, and international anti-piracy/terrorism agencies (Bueger & Edmunds, 2017:1299).

Maritime cooperation is critical to managing the oceans and regional seas, including the use of marine resources and many areas of maritime security. Part IX of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) mandates that governments bordering an enclosed or semi-

enclosed sea cooperate. The UNEP Regional Seas Programme has formalized this cooperative approach. This offers a framework for a regional dialogue on the comprehensive and integrated management of marine and coastal regions, including formulating action plans to address marine environmental concerns. However, it has only had a limited impact (Cordner, 2018:25).

In Southeast Asia, programs spearheaded purely by coastal or state agencies of regional significance, such as the Malacca Straits Patrol, for instance, have proven to be more successful than initiatives spearheaded by foreign countries. Countries in the region, particularly Indonesia, see marine crime as a local problem and treat it as such, deciding how best to deal with it. Only when foreign help is impartial, limited, and non-military are coastal states appreciative of international assistance (Laksmana, 2011:104). This cooperation concept and the parts required to put it into action on a security issue are available for purchase, even if an external actor is not sought. Indonesia, for example, it has been made plain that the presence of foreign military forces is completely unavoidable (Budiana, et.al., 2019). On the other hand, it is grateful for financial and technical assistance. For example, the United States and Australia provide security assistance and counter-terrorism financing to Indonesia, while Japan provides humanitarian help. Moreover, Indonesia collaborates with India on coordinated patrols, and it has inked several agreements with countries such as Australia, Japan, and India to strengthen security cooperation (Gopal & Alverdian, 2021:5). Following the re-establishment of the United States International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, Indonesia increased its defense ties with the United States.

Numerous frameworks, including states from beyond the region, have proven problematic. The United States first proposed the Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI) in 2004. With the help of Japanese lawmakers, the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) was put together, which was signed

the following year. These attempts, particularly those led by the United States, aroused controversy over sovereignty concerns and competing objectives. Specifically, many Malaysians and Indonesians were against the US stationing troops in the Straits of Malacca, owing to both countries' previous assertions that security in Southeast Asia is solely the responsibility of individual nations and that external powers should abstain from interfering in their internal affairs. In comparison, the difficulties with ReCAAP was primarily due to the global Information Sharing Center's (ISC) physical position (Ian, 2008).

The Regional Collaboration and Assistance Program developed a framework for member states' collaboration around three core activities: the exchange of knowledge, the construction of capabilities, and the coordination of operations are all important components. An Incident Support Center (ISC) would be established in one of the sixteen-member countries to facilitate operational, information exchange, and communication collaboration within its ranks. Malaysia and Indonesia withdrew their ratification of the agreement in protest of the International Security Center's choice of Singapore as its location, mainly due to the potential that the center might publish research that was unjustly critical of littoral governments (Bradford, 2008).

Furthermore, the agreement members to disclose only information that is relevant to future attacks on copyrighted material, and nothing more (Bradford, 2005). Members are free to share information that they believe is relevant to imminent piracy assaults. It has become less problematic and acceptable in recent years despite Japan's ongoing efforts to expand cooperation with other countries in a variety of sectors, including safety in navigating by charting the ocean floor, as well as aiding anti-piracy efforts through training and equipment exchanges. Japanese diplomacy in interacting in line with the ASEAN Way, which emphasizes civil-military cooperation in security management (Sato, 2007).

Japan has placed a strong emphasis on civilian collaboration. Apart from disaster relief in the region, it has not used its marine self-defense force directly to achieve any other goals. Additionally, it's worth noting that promoting cooperation through international organizations is a feasible option, which should be stressed. According to the report, extra-regional countries can collaborate with international organizations to play a more significant contribution to improving maritime safety. For example, in the Malacca Straits, a collaboration between coastal states and the International Maritime Organization (IMO) has been realized through two meetings, the first of which Jakarta was the venue for the event in 2005 and the second of which took place in Kuala Lumpur the following year. Meetings between shipping companies and the states that use their services would be held regularly by the Tripartite Technical Experts Group in order to facilitate cooperation on issues related to the safety and security of Malacca Straits and the South China Sea (Organization, 2006).

The Kuala Lumpur Statement, which was adopted during the second meeting, demonstrates the seriousness with which the participants are collaborating to accomplish their objectives. It was agreed in this statement to support the littoral states' ongoing efforts as well as building a mechanism for environmental and navigational safety cooperation, with the objective of promoting dialogue and facilitating close cooperation between littoral states, user states, the shipping industry, and other interested parties. What opportunities exist for cooperation between Europe and Southeast Asia, with a particular emphasis on Europe? Despite major navigational interests, as a result, the European Union has kept its presence in Southeast Asia low-key thus far when it comes to the region's maritime security challenges. In this debate, the EU does not have a monopoly on influence, but it can do more to advance answers. Their principal objectives are to ensure the stability of global commons while also maintaining unrestricted access to all ships via the Sea Lanes of Communication. In Southeast Asia, the EU

should avoid exceeding the bounds of its very modest clout; rather, it should work more consistently on maritime security in the region, for example by prioritizing technological cooperation (Khandekar, 2012).

Visibility is critical in this case. To begin, promoting individual (or bilateral) engagement with Asia's littoral countries, particularly Indonesia, should take precedence over other factors. For future technical assistance to expand capacity, the EU and Indonesia have the best chances. This includes coastline guard and patrol training, as well as naval infrastructure construction. EU participation in Asian security forums such as the ASEAN Regional Forum is essential as long as it is multilateral. The EU had a busy year in Asia in 2012. For example, European Union High Representative attended and participated in the ARF Ministerial Meeting and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) on behalf of the European Union. Maintaining this degree of active participation and visibility in various circumstances is critical.

Providing technical support and sharing legal experience are both in the EU's best interests, and the EU should take advantage of this opportunity. According to the authors, it can also contribute to the empowering of already established frameworks. The conduct of exercises by extra-regional powers can help create confidence and interoperability, exercises that are naval forces around the world can benefit from both bilateral and international cooperation, which in turn helps them better guard the straits. Such exercises also improve interoperability, which will make it easier for future operational cooperation to take place if the chance presents itself.

V. CONCLUSION

However, there are still difficulties. In reality, there will be more issues ahead as international crime is growing at an ever-increasing rate. Because maritime security concerns are predominantly transnational, international collaboration is required for a successful response to be effective. Changes in the regional system's structure, norms, and economics make it easier to collaborate on marine security issues

in the future. In light of the strengthening of regional cooperation standards, maritime security should be emphasized, and more significant efforts should be made the promotion of improved regional cooperation in terms of marine security. The agenda should continue to include enhancing regional maritime security cooperation, both bilaterally and multilaterally. Due to the shared interest in marine security and economic stability by several countries, there is an increased opportunity for sharing burdens and working together collaboratively.

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