

Electoral Performance Of Ji And Jui-F In Pakistan: A Comparative Study Of 2013 And 2018 Elections

Muhammad Safdar Hussain (Corresponding Author)¹, Dr. Asia Saif Alvi²

¹Ph. D Scholar Department of Politics & IR University of Sargodha, Sargodha.

²Department of Politics & IR University of Sargodha, Sargodha.

Abstract

Over the past ten years, there have been substantial changes in Pakistan's electoral environment, which are mostly attributable to the growth of political parties with a religious focus. This article compares the electoral results of two well-known Islamic parties, Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) and Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI-F), during the general elections of 2013 and 2018. The study employs a thorough methodology, combining both qualitative and quantitative techniques to examine the variables that influence the accomplishments and challenges of political parties in two successive elections. To find trends in their electoral outcomes, it takes into consideration a variety of variables, including their ideologies, organizational structure, campaign tactics and geographical variations. The article also looks at how political parties adjust to societal changes and how voter behavior changes. The findings help us comprehend the complicated electoral paths taken by two religious parties, JI and JUI-F, and shed light on how Islamic politics have impacted Pakistan's democracy. As Pakistan navigates its shifting political environment, this understanding is essential for its political progress.

Key Words: Pakistan, JI, JUI-F, quantitative and qualitative techniques, democracy.

1. Introduction

Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) and Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI-F) are two most significant and influential religio-political parties that support the application of Islamic law and politics. They can influence elections through coalitions with mainstream parties and have religious networks to organize votes. Both parties act as a counterbalance to secular forces in Pakistan's complex political system, ensuring that religious principles are upheld in public discourse. They exert pressure on the government through marches and protests even when they are not in power. Both parties have taken part in coalition governments, giving them the chance to have an impact on legislation and advance their ideological causes. They may not have a majority, but they garner a sizable number of votes and seats,

making them important figures in Pakistani politics.

In short, JI and JUI-F are crucial players in Pakistan's electoral politics because of their fervent religious beliefs, voter turnout, regional clout and partnerships with mainstream parties, giving conservative Islamic viewpoints a voice within the democratic system.

1.1 Role of Religion in Pakistan's Political Scenario

Religion has played a central role in shaping politics in the Indian subcontinent, especially during Pakistan's creation. In the 1945-1946 elections, the Muslim League used religion to gain Muslim support, becoming the second-largest party. After partition, the emphasis on religion reduced, but the 1949 Objective Resolution affirmed Pakistan's Islamic identity (Talbot, 2009).

Over time, the connection between religion and party affiliation weakened. The Muslim League lost popularity within seven years. Religious parties found success through alliances, like the 2002 MMA coalition. They also had street power, influencing voter turnout and staging protests on various issues (Misra, 2003).

External factors, such as Pakistan's involvement in international conflicts, led religious parties to protest strongly. Recent events, like the Quran burning in Sweden, sparked protests.

In Pakistan, religious parties have had significant influence, but their electoral support does not always match their street power. They can disrupt governments through protests more easily than secure power constitutionally. The relationship between religion and politics in Pakistan is complex, driven by sociological, loyalty, and rational choice factors in voting behavior. This election reflected various models of voting behavior, including communal voting based on religion, strong loyalty to the Muslim League and its leader, Quaid-e-Azam and rational choices influenced by past experiences with Congress.

In short, religious parties in Pakistan have historically wielded significant influence, but their electoral support has not mirrored their street power. They have the potential to disrupt governments more easily through protests and demonstrations than to secure power through constitutional means. While religion continues to be a potent force in Pakistan's political landscape, the relationship between faith and politics has evolved over time, reflecting a complex interplay of sociological, loyalty-based and rational choice factors in voting behavior.

Arend Lijphart, a prominent political scientist, has made significant contributions to the field of comparative politics. His work highlights the benefits of studying multiple cases to gain a deeper understanding of political systems. Comparative analysis helps us study political phenomena more thoroughly by identifying patterns, variations and causal relationships across different cases. It allows

researchers to explore how different cultures and societies shape political behavior and institutions, considering the influence of cultural, historical and contextual factors.

Comparative research helps in theory development and testing, enabling researchers to refine their ideas and evaluate their applicability across various situations. Policymakers can use insights from comparative research to make informed decisions about political systems, policies and changes.

The validity of research findings is strengthened when patterns persist across multiple cases, promoting a comprehensive understanding of political systems. Comparative politics encourages the exchange of ideas and experiences among countries, helping policymakers learn from each other's successes and mistakes. Comparative electoral studies provide valuable insights into voting patterns, participation rates and electoral reforms, which can enhance political involvement and integrity.

Electoral systems significantly impact representation, gender equality and minority participation and comparative studies shed light on these effects. Learning from election failures in other countries can help states improve their electoral systems and prevent repeating mistakes. Comparative analysis contributes to political literacy and civic education, helping voters better understand their own electoral systems and their impact on political stability and party dynamics. Ultimately, comparative electoral studies support democratic reforms, enhance electoral integrity and strengthen democratic institutions worldwide (Lijphart, 1971).

2 Comparative Analysis of JI and JUI-F

While JI and JUI-F are two prominent Islamist political parties in Pakistan, they differ significantly in terms of their historical roots, political philosophies and responses to religious and social issues, though having some ideological overlap.

2.1 Ideological Orientation

JI and JUI-F are both Islamist parties in Pakistan, but they have distinct backgrounds and approaches. JI is focused on enforcing Sharia law and establishing an Islamic state. It was founded in 1941 to oppose nationalist and secular movements. JI emphasizes social and educational efforts and has limited electoral success.

On the other hand, JUI-F, rooted in the Deobandi Sunni school of thought, promotes conservative Islamic values and seeks Islamic principles in legislation. It is more pragmatic in politics, forming coalitions and participating in coalition governments. JUI-F has historically worked with state institutions and has a significant presence in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) region. Both parties share Islamic goals but differ in their historical origins, political strategies and approaches to social and religious issues (Roy, 1994).

2.2 Leadership

The JI and JUI-F are prominent Pakistani political parties with distinct characteristics. JI boasts a well-structured, democratic organization with regular leadership elections based on qualities like piety and loyalty, rather than family ties. In contrast, JUI-F has a decentralized structure, primarily comprising Pashtun members and is led by a single leader. JI is known for its organized, non-family-controlled setup, while JUI-F emphasizes a simpler, regional approach with a Pashtun majority and centralized leadership (Abbas, 2014).

The JUI-F and JI have different approaches to politics. JUI-F is focused on electoral success and has undergone changes in its name, leadership and strategies over the years. The Markazi Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (MJUI), a faction that broke away from JUI, was founded in 1947 and played a role in the adoption of the Objectives Resolution in 1949.

Under the leadership of Mufti Mehmood in 1962, JUI became more politically active and gained support in Balochistan and KP (formerly NWFP). After Mufti Mehmood's

death in 1980, the party split into JUI-S, led by Molana Sami-ul-Haq and JUI-F, led by Molana Fazal-Ur-Rehman. The former supported General Zia's regime, while the latter had a different stance (Mehmood, 2018).

Both JI and JUI-F support Islamic fundamentalism and want Islamic law to play a more prominent role in Pakistan's politics and society. They still believe in the Two-Nation Theory, which asserts that Pakistan is an Islamic Republic. Interestingly, even though the founders of these parties initially opposed the idea of a separate Muslim country in the Indian subcontinent, they often refer to Allama Muhammad Iqbal, who is credited with creating the Two-Nation Theory, in their discussions (Jaffrelot, 2012).

According to Ahmar (2012), many Pakistanis misinterpret secularism. Islamists argue that Pakistan was created as an Islamic state where Muslims could live under Sharia law, often citing the Two-Nation Theory to support their stance. They claim that Western influences and secular forces have led Pakistan astray in its 76-year history. The goal of reuniting the MMA is to establish authentic Islamic ideals and realize the vision of Pakistan's founding fathers based on the Two-Nation Theory (Aziz, 1967). Initially, religious organizations were against Pakistan's creation. However, they have accepted the two-nation theory as the rationale for Pakistan's creation, emphasizing the religious split.

Some leaders, including JI leader Sirajul Haq, have emphasized the shared goals of Allama Iqbal and Maulana Maududi for the renaissance of Islam. While Maulana Maududi sought to inform Muslims of the Holy Quran and Sunnah (Islamic teachings). According to Haq, Dr. Iqbal envisioned an autonomous Muslim state in the Subcontinent (Khan, 2013).

2.3 Manifestos

A manifesto is a statement of values, aims and objectives declared by a person, group of people, organization, or political party. It serves as a mission statement and lists the goals and

guiding principles that the organization wants to realize.

- **JI's Manifesto in 2013 Election**

The 29-point party manifesto for the 2013 general elections was released by JI leader Syed Munawar Hasan. The key principles of the manifesto stated that the JI wanted to make Pakistan into a model state like Madina, where everyone might have equal rights. One of the main goals of the JI, along with the suppression of terrorism and lawlessness, was to restore national sovereignty. Along with the removal of the feudal system, unemployment and power outages, improvements to agriculture were also emphasized in the manifesto. In its manifesto, the JI vowed to revitalize the industrial sector across the country and devised a groundbreaking industrial program. It included housing initiatives for the poor and downtrodden in addition to the promotion of justice and equitable educational opportunities. It also placed a strong emphasis on the development of regional and local government systems, as well as independent media. In addition to measures for equal rights and employment opportunities, the JI's manifesto had a special Baluchistan Package (Dawn, 2013 April 15).

- **JUI-F's Manifesto in 2013 Election**

JUI-F leader Maulana Fazal Rahman introduced the party's 19-point election manifesto during a news conference on April 15, 2013, at the National news Club in Islamabad. The aforementioned manifesto placed a lot of focus on establishing peace through contracts and plans for rapprochement. The promotion of Wahdat-e-Millat, freedom and respect for human rights, as well as the adoption of debt-reduction strategies such to those utilized by Greece and Argentina, are other traits (Dawn, 2013 April 15).

- **MMA's Manifesto in 2018 Election**

In preparation for the 2018 elections, MMA President Maulana Fazl-ur Rehman released a 12-point manifesto that essentially covered every topic, from local governance to the safety of Muslim minority abroad. Allama Sajid Naqvi of the Islami Tehreek, Senator Sirajul Haq of the Jamaat-i-Islami, Pir Ejaz Hashmi of the Jamiat Ulema-i-Pakistan, Senator Sirajul Haq of the Jamaat-i-Islami and the central office holders of the Markazi Jamiat Ahle Hadith were present when the manifesto was unveiled. The establishment of constitutional reforms for the devolution of power to the grassroots level, land for landless peasants, jobs for locals in CPEC projects, support for the creation of new provinces, the enforcement of Sharia, the provision of protection to Islamic laws already present in the constitution, the promotion of the independence of the judiciary, the assurance of impartial and neutral administration and the introduction of these salient features. In order for Pakistan to establish relations with other nations on an equal footing, the alliance of religious parties promised to develop a free and honorable foreign policy. The creation of a global bloc of Muslim nations, the building of water reservoirs, the implementation of an energy policy, the encouragement of small businesses, the revival of national industrial complexes, the provision of interest-free agricultural loans, the abolition of the system of class-based education and the promotion of national and regional languages are some of the other features of the manifesto (Dawn, 2018 June 6).

2.4 Comparison of Manifestos of 2013 and 2018

Since JI and JUI-F contested the 2013 election separately, each party released its own manifesto. On April 15, 2013, JUI-F released its 19-point election manifesto, which emphasized issues like the establishment of peace through a strategy and agreement for reconciliation, freedom and respect for all people, advocacy for Wahdat-e-Millat and the adoption of debt-busting tactics similar to those used by Greece and Argentina. The primary

themes of JI's 29-point manifesto, which was presented in March 2013, were to make Pakistan a model state equivalent to Madina, equality of rights, state sovereignty, the abolition of terrorism, lawlessness, the feudal system, unemployment and the power problem.

3. Ideological Resonance of JI and JUI-F with Electorate

JI and JUI-F are prominent religious parties in Pakistan with distinct ideologies and strategies. JI seeks to establish an Islamic state governed by strict Sharia law, targeting conservative religious groups. They prioritize moral values, social justice and anti-corruption efforts, often engaging in welfare and educational activities. JI relies on grassroots mobilization and community-based approaches.

In contrast, JUI-F takes a more pragmatic approach, advocating for the preservation of Islamic values within Pakistan's existing legal system. They have a broader support base, including moderate urban and rural populations with conservative beliefs, especially in Balochistan and KP province. JUI-F focuses on religious liberty, Islamic education and defending minority rights, challenging laws conflicting with Islamic principles. They are more flexible and cooperative in politics.

In short, JI aims for a puritanical Islamic state and appeals to those seeking a thorough implementation of Islamic principles, while JUI-F attracts a wider range of religious individuals who prioritize defending Islamic values within the current legal and political framework. Both parties actively engage in electoral politics, shaping Pakistan's social and political landscape with their differing visions of Islam's role in society.

3.1 Impact of Ideologies on Electoral Performance of JI and JUI-F

The religious orientation, policies, organizational structures and historical circumstances are just a few of the variables that have an impact on the ideologies and

electoral results of JI and JUI-F. Based on its understanding of Sharia law, JI is a religious and ideological party that aims to build an Islamic state. In all facets of life, including government, it urges rigorous devotion to Islamic precepts. The ideology of JI frequently appeals to a conservative religious base and its adherents come from a variety of socio-economic strata.

The rigid religious attitude of JI may impede its ability to win over a larger number of voters. Although it has a loyal voting base that supports its ideological objectives, its rigidity may deter voters who are looking for more practical answers to governmental and socio-economic problems.

Sometimes JI's policy recommendations for addressing the electorate's everyday concerns, such as economic issues, education and healthcare, are overshadowed by its concentration on religious principles. This may limit its appeal to people who value these pragmatic issues. To strengthen its electoral effect, JI has occasionally forged agreements with other political parties. However, depending on the objectives of the people, these coalitions can result in compromises on its fundamental ideals.

JUI-F, on the other hand, largely supports Deobandi Islam and has always worked to protect what it sees as Pakistan's Islamic character through activism and policy. JUI-F is able to draw support from a sizeable voter base that identify with its conservative and Islamic ideals. The party's electoral success may be impacted by its capacity to mobilize religious sentiments, particularly in places where these sentiments are prevalent.

KP province and particular regions of Balochistan are frequently the JUI-F's strongholds. With its religious agenda and emphasis on regional and local issues, it may be able to connect with particular communities and win seats there. JUI-F has occasionally demonstrated adaptability when establishing coalitions with other political parties to boost its power. This practical strategy might enable it to

win over voters outside of its main constituency.

Similar to JI, JUI-F struggles to strike a balance between its religious ideology and realistic policy recommendations that deal with governance and socio-economic challenges. Finding this balance may increase its attractiveness to more voters. Both JI and JUI-F are influenced by their respective religious views, which draw in some demographics but may potentially restrict their electoral success overall. Their electoral performances are greatly influenced by their capacity to adapt, establish coalitions and convince voters of the merits of their programs.

3.2 Anthony Downs Theory of Ideological Convergence

Anthony Downs' theory of ideological convergence, outlined in his book, *An Economic Theory of Democracy*, explores how political parties in a two-party system tend to adopt similar policy positions to attract a broader ribbon of voters. In such systems, parties aim to appeal to diverse voter preferences by moving their policies closer to the center of the political spectrum. This strategy, related to the Median Voter Theorem, assumes that parties act rationally to maximize their chances of winning elections. Extremist positions are avoided to prevent alienating voters.

In essence, parties converge towards the political center to court the median voter, whose views represent the middle ground. This convergence is driven by the pursuit of electoral victory. However, it is important to acknowledge that real-world politics is more complex, influenced by factors like party ideologies, historical legacies, charismatic

candidates and voter turnout. While Downs' theory offers valuable insights, it simplifies the multifaceted nature of political dynamics. Nonetheless, it remains a useful framework for understanding how parties strategically position themselves in competitive two-party systems to gain voter support and increase their electoral prospects (Downs, 1957).

4 Comparison of Electoral History of JI and JUI-F

JI and JUI-F, each have their own philosophies and strategies for winning elections. JI is a right-wing Islamic party which is passionately in favour of a Sharia-based Islamic state. It focuses on mobilizing the local community, moral problems and conservative religious voters. However, it has had little success in provincial assemblies, particularly in KP where it struggles to win many members in the National Assembly.

While JUI-F is a likewise right-wing, it prioritizes the needs of traditional Islamic clerics and pursues politics with pragmatism. In rural areas, especially KP and Balochistan, it has gained significant support and a strong presence. JUI-F has a history of taking part in coalition governments at the provincial and national levels, giving it a bigger voice in Pakistani politics. While JUI-F plans huge protests to sway public opinion and achieve political clout, JI organizes small-scale demonstrations on matters connected to Islamic beliefs. JUI-F has a concentrated stronghold in particular places whereas JI has a wider appeal throughout regions but fluctuating electoral strength. As a result, these parties play different roles in Pakistan's political scene due to ideological differences, electoral approaches and regional support.

Table: 1 Electoral History of JI and JUI-F

Sr.No.	Elections	JI	JUI-F
1	GE 1970	Party won 04 NA seats	JUI Secured 07 seats in NA
2	GE 1977	Both were part of PNA which won 36 seats while PPP won 155 seats	

3	GE 1985	Elections were conducted on Non-Party Basis	
4	GE 1988	Joined IJI which secured 55 seats in NA.	Secured 07 seats in NA
5	GE 1990	Joined IJI which secured 104 seats in NA	Got 06 seats in NA
6	GE 1993	Contested through PIF and secured 03 seats in NA.	JUI-F formed IJM Seats 4 seats (2+2)
7	GE 1997	JI boycotted the Election	JUI-F won 02 seats in NA
8	GE 2002	Both contested from MMA and secured 45 in National Assembly.	
9	GE 2008	JI joined All Parties Democratic Movement (APDM) and boycotted polls	JUI-F under MMA won 7 seats (6 general+1 R.W) in NA.
10	GE 2013	JI secured 04 seats in NA	JUI-F secured 15 seats in NA
11	GE 2018	Both contested this election from MMA which won 12 seats in N.A.	

Source: Prepared by the Researcher based on the data from ECP website.

4.1 Comparative Analysis of 2013 and 2018 Elections

Pakistan's general election in 2013 was a pivotal moment in its political history. For the first time since the country's founding in 1947, it represented a key turning point in the democratic process and a peaceful transition of power from one civilian government to another. In Pakistan, there have been multiple instances of military dictatorship and authoritarianism and instability have frequently characterized the nation's political environment. The Pakistan People's Party (PPP), which had been in power for the previous five years, was defeated in this election, signaling a favorable shift towards bolstering democratic institutions and the rule of law. This setback proved that Pakistan's citizens could use the election process to select and keep their government accountable.

PML-N won the 2013 election and went on to form the government. The peaceful transition of power from one civilian government to another was one of this election's most notable accomplishments. This changeover offered a good example for next elections and revealed the country's democratic systems' maturation. Additionally, this election saw a comparatively

high voter turnout, demonstrating the electorate's active participation in the political process.

This higher turnout was encouraging for the credibility of the election results. There were some claims of electoral irregularities, even though the election was generally thought to be more transparent and fair than previous ones. However, compared to other elections, the way the election was handled overall was deemed better.

During its term, the elected government had to deal with a number of economic and governance issues. The government faced several difficult challenges, including the energy crisis, terrorism, corruption and economic changes. For succeeding general elections in Pakistan, this election set the standard. It reaffirmed the notion that the people hold the true authority of government and laid the groundwork for greater democratic consolidation. On the other side, the 2018 general election in Pakistan was also very historic because it saw the democratic transfer of power from one civilian government to another for the second time in a row. In

general, it was the tenth general election, marking the end of ten continuous years of democratic rule by civilian governments. Consecutive elections and peaceful transfers of power show some signs of democratic consolidation since 2008 but each election cycle has been marred by problems that have only helped to aggravate already-existing political differences. This election caused a lot of the political landscape to change due to the entry of new actors. The Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), led by Imran Khan, won the most votes and formed the government.

4.2 Registered Voters

In the 2018 general election, there was a substantial increase in voter participation, with up to 8.45 million more people casting their ballots compared to the 2013 general election. This indicates a continued commitment among the populace to exercise their right to vote, despite a slight dip in the national voter turnout, which decreased from 53.62 percent in 2013 to 51.99 percent in 2018.

The significant growth in the number of voters between these two elections can be attributed primarily to a surge in voter registrations. In 2013, there were 86.18 million registered voters and by 2018, this number had risen to 105.96 million. This increase in

registered voters over five years was much higher than the 14.27 million increase observed over the ten-year period between 2002 and 2013. This rise in voter registrations and the subsequent changes in the political landscape were partly due to the involvement of new political parties. Imran Khan's Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) emerged as the center-right party with the most votes in the 2018 election.

The introduction of the Elections Act of 2017 played a significant role in encouraging voter registration. The Act emphasized making the voting process more accessible, particularly for women, as outlined in Sections 12(c), 47 and 48. Several initiatives, such as the Gender and Disability Group at the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP), District Voter Education Committees (DVECs) and collaborations with civil society organizations, contributed to the substantial expansion of the electoral rolls for the GE-2018.

In short, the increase in voter participation in the 2018 general election compared to 2013 can be attributed to a notable rise in voter registrations, driven by the Elections Act of 2017 and various initiatives aimed at simplifying the voting process and encouraging broader participation, particularly among women.

Table: 2 Comparison of Registered Voters in 2013 and 2018 Elections

Elections	Male	Female	Total
	Registered Voters	Registered Voters	Registered Voters
2013	48,592,492	,37,597,343	86,189,835
2018	59,224,262	46,731,147	105,955,409

4.3 Voter Turnout

Pakistan's voter participation rate has been consistently low over the years. On average, it has been around 47.82 percent in the last ten general elections. This decline started after the 1970 elections, where the turnout was 64 percent. Subsequent elections in 1977, 1985, 1988, 1990, 1993, 2002 and 2008 saw decreasing turnout rates, with the lowest point

being in the 1997 general election (Express Tribune, 2013).

In the 2013 elections, the voter turnout was 55.2 percent, but in the 2018 elections, it dropped to 51.7 percent according to ECP data. In 2013, the ECP introduced a form called the Statement of Tally (Form XIV) to count male and female ballots separately at each polling place. During those elections, presiding officers had to count and record the number of ballots

from male and female polling places in separate boxes using this form. (FAFEN, 2013 June). The Election Commission can now analyze voter turnout for men and women separately in each national and provincial assembly seat due to a new policy. This data helps the Election Commission, political parties, civil society groups and scholars understand why female voter turnout is lower than male turnout in certain regions.

In 2018, for the first time in the country's history, the Elections Act of 2017 required gender-specific voter turnout data to be reported at the polling station level. This data was recorded separately for men and women on Form-45 (Result of the Count) and Form-47 (Provisional Consolidated Statement of Results

of the Count). According to Form-47 data, about 56.01percent of registered male voters participated in the 2018 General Election by voting for National Assembly (NA) constituencies, while only 46.90percent of registered female voters did the same.

In the 2018 general election, fewer women than men voted across the country and in all assemblies. Specifically, only 46.89 percent of registered women voters cast their ballots for the National Assembly, while 56.07 percent of registered men did so. On election-day, there were 11.18 million fewer women who voted compared to men, which isn't surprising given that there are nearly 12 million fewer registered women voters than men (FAFEN Report General Election, 2018).

Table: 3 History of Voter Turnout (percentage) from 1988 to 2018

Elections	1988	1990	1993	1997	2002	2008	2013	2018
Voter Turnout	43.07	45.46	40.28	35.42	41.08	44.23	55.02	51.7

Source: Prepared by the Researcher based on the data from ECP website

4.4 Vote-bank

In Pakistan's political history, religious parties have faced challenges in winning elections and forming governments. In 2002, the MMA briefly came to power in KP due to anti-American sentiments, but it had limited impact in Punjab and Sindh. By 2008, MMA fell apart, earning only 2.1% of the vote. In 2013, JI and

JUI-F campaigned separately and received 6.74% of the vote. In 2018, twelve religious parties united and got 9.8% of the vote, performing well in KP and Balochistan. The MMA, led by JI and JUI-F, secured 4.85% of the vote, winning 12 seats in the National Assembly (Hassan and Saleem, 2018).

Table: 4 Party-wise Vote-bank of JI and JUI-F in 2013 Election

Party	National Assembly	Balochistan	KPK	Punjab	Sindh
JI	963909	3627	404895	489772	131141
JUI-F	1461371	207167	733777	153398	105799

Source: Prepared by the researcher based on the data from ECP website.

5. Electoral Performance of Religious Parties in 2013 Elections

Religious parties in Pakistan may not always win many seats in national or provincial assemblies, but they still have influence, particularly in conservative rural areas and among religious scholars and madrasa students. Their support is stronger in some regions than

in cities. While some religious parties have won a few seats in parliament in various elections, others have not been as successful. Overall, religious parties play a role in shaping public opinion on religious and social issues in Pakistan.

5.1 Leadership qualities of JI and JUI-F in the context of theories

Maulana Fazal Ur Rehman and Maulana Maududi were prominent figures in Pakistani Islamic politics, each demonstrating distinct leadership styles. Maududi displayed transformative leadership by inspiring his followers to work towards establishing an Islamic state based on his interpretation of Islam. His communication skills and charismatic presence helped him gain followers and spread his ideological views. He led by example, adhering to his principles and promoting a high moral code.

In contrast, Fazal Ur Rehman exhibited transactional leadership, focusing on practical politics and bargaining to secure benefits for his supporters in exchange for political support. He excelled at forming alliances, bringing together religious and political forces to achieve common goals. He adapted his strategies according to the political climate, aligning with different parties and governments as needed.

Both leaders blended aspects of various leadership theories, adapting to their unique circumstances and followers. Their ideologies, personal traits and the challenges they faced influenced their leadership styles. In the political landscape, religious parties occasionally joined coalition governments at federal and provincial levels, advocating for laws aligning with their religious beliefs, such as blasphemy laws or Sharia. However, these parties faced criticism for their positions, with some accusing them of sectarian politics and extremism.

All religious parties are the same and there are variations in their beliefs and practices. In elections, some parties like JI and PTI abstained in 2008 and differences between JI and JUI-F prevented a joint campaign in 2013. These religious parties received 6.75 percent of the total votes in the 2013 elections. Overall, Maududi and Fazal Ur Rehman had distinctive leadership styles influenced by their individual characteristics and the ever-changing political landscape in Pakistan.

In the 2013 elections in Pakistan, religious parties faced significant voter rejection, receiving only 6.74 percent of the vote share overall. The PML-N won with 32.8 percent and PTI formed the government in KP with 16.9 percent of the vote. This rejection of religious parties was a recurring trend, as they had also performed poorly in the 2008 elections.

The MMA, an alliance of religious parties, was largely inactive and two of its main components, JI and JUI-F, ran separately due to internal disputes. Despite declining electoral results, JUI-F and JI still outperformed other religious groups, particularly in KP and Balochistan. Balochistan had low voter turnout and no party secured a majority there. JUI-F won 10 seats and JI, running independently for the first time in years, only got 3 seats. Compared to other religious parties, these results were relatively better.

Despite the historical coalition of religious parties in 2002, the declining support for them made it unlikely for a similar coalition to emerge in Pakistan's current political landscape.

Religious parties also faced challenges in Rawalpindi, where PML-N and PTI dominated. ANP, a liberal party, was seen as a rival to conservative parties like JUI-F, JI and Qaumi Watan Party (QWP).

Despite the religious aspect of Pakistani politics, voters seemed more inclined towards parties like PML-N, PPP and PTI, possibly due to their track records and high aspirations. The 2013 elections showed Pakistan's desire for a stronger democracy and economy alongside religious considerations. In short, the 2013 elections in Pakistan reflected a continued rejection of religious parties by voters, with PML-N, PPP and PTI garnering more support due to their perceived competence and aspirations for a better Pakistan. (Krishnan, 2013).

Religious parties had a significant impact, even if they did not significantly increase their representation in the National Assembly. Pakistan has a diverse

political environment and religious groups that promote the implementation of Islamic

principles in government have consistently taken part in the country's electoral process.

Table: 5 Over-all Electoral History of Religious Parties in Pakistan

Sr. No.	Elections	Registered Votes	Votes Polled	Voter Turnout	Votes (taken by Religious Parties)	%age
1	GE 1970	56,941,500 West Pakistan 25,730,280 + East Pakistan 31,211,220	16318808	63%	3481284	21.33
2	GE 1977	29,883,212	16,894,991	54 %	6168530	20.64
3	GE 1985	3258996	17,250,482	52.93%	Non-Party Basis	----
4	GE 1988	4,76,29,892	20361057	42.75%	447706	2.29
5	GE 1990	4,89,52,991	2,18,82,104	44.70%	1173063	5.52
6	GE 1993	51,867,876	20,758,179	40.02%	1378430	6.68
7	GE 1997	55,737,177	19,949,269	35.79%	430002	2.18
8	GE 2002	71,866,278	30012407	41.76%	3511851	11.72
9	GE 2008	80,724,153	35793003	44.34%	780103	2.19
10	GE 2013	76194802	46217482	55.02%	3035893	6.74
11	GE 2018	105,955,409	54321031	51.7%	5148001	9.48

Source: Prepared by the researcher based on data from ECP website.

5.2 Electoral Comparison of Religious Parties in 2013 and 2018 Elections

In Pakistan's political landscape, religious parties have historically participated in elections, advocating for the application of Islamic values in government. In the 2013 general election, these parties played a role, but they did not win many seats. However, the 2018 elections saw the rise of new religious parties, notably Tehreek-a-Labbaik (TLP), which surprised everyone by outperforming established parties like JI and JUI-F.

Despite 12 religious parties running in the 2018 elections, they collectively received only 9.58% of the national vote, with 5,203,285 votes out of 54,319,922 cast. Punjab had the highest number of votes in favor of religious parties (2,704,856 votes), but it was only 7.98% of Punjab's total vote share, the lowest among provinces according to the Election Commission of Pakistan. Sindh saw more support for religious parties, with 1,116,644

votes (10.57% of the total) (Dawn, 2018, August 1).

In KP, JUI-F and the JI-led MMA secured 12 National Assembly seats with 2.5 million votes. The MMA had been a major player in 2002 but disintegrated after the 2008 elections. JUI-F and JI had seen fluctuations in their vote shares in previous elections. Some smaller religious parties saw significant changes in their vote counts. JUI-Nazryati-Pakistan gained more votes in 2018, while Majlis Wahdatul Muslimeen and Sunni Ittehad Council lost support. Notably, the newly formed Tehreek-i-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP) emerged as the fifth-largest party, securing 1,887,419 votes in Punjab and controlling the religious voting bloc in the province. TLP also had competitive candidates in Sindh. In short, while established religious parties saw mixed results, new parties like TLP made a significant impact in the 2018 elections, reshaping Pakistan's political landscape (Jahangir, R. 2018).

In the 2018 elections in Karachi, the TLP won two National Assembly seats and two Provincial Assembly seats. They were able to defeat prominent political figures in some constituencies. Another religious party, the Allah-o-Akbar Tehreek (AAT), led by Hafiz Saeed, also performed well despite not being officially registered due to ties with a banned organization.

The AAT received over 55,000 votes for the National Assembly and had success in Punjab. In the past, the Pakistan Rah-a-Haq Party had some electoral success, especially in KP and Sindh. The Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat, linked to the banned Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), had candidates running for office. The religious alliance MMA, which was prominent under Musharraf's rule, did not play a significant role in these elections. Overall, religious parties faced declining support and it's unlikely that a coalition like the one in 2002 will happen again. In KP, the JUI-F had high hopes but faced tough competition from the PML-N and PTI and the Taliban targeted the ANP. However, religious parties still had limited chances of winning against secular and liberal parties in free and fair elections. Their influence doesn't necessarily translate into political power.

The leader of the JUI-F took careful steps in 2008 to maintain the support of the party's religious base while also attracting electable candidates. They even invited respected religious experts to run for office, but they declined. The party also admitted women and newcomers, including those who were wealthy and without beards, as candidates. However, despite these efforts to secure votes, religious parties couldn't achieve a majority in any region. This was not primarily due to the religious aspect, as both Nawaz Sharif and Imran Khan, though not strictly secular, emphasized Islamic values in their politics. Instead, the support for parties like PML-N, PPP and PTI stemmed from their strong track records and ambitious goals. The PPP still had

some public trust, Nawaz Sharif was an established leader and Imran Khan had high expectations to fulfill.

Even though the JUI-F shifted its focus to socioeconomic issues, its past inability to deliver on these fronts made it seem ill-equipped to handle Pakistan's economic challenges. The 2013 elections showed that Pakistan desired a stronger democracy and economy alongside its religious affiliations. While religious parties didn't gain many seats in the National Assembly, they still had a significant impact in Pakistan's diverse political landscape.

In the 2018 elections, the PTI emerged victorious and became the dominant party in the assembly. Notably, far-right parties expanded their influence, with Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP) rising from being the fifth-largest party in 2013 to becoming Pakistan's largest religious political party. A Gallup survey revealed that 46% of TLP voters in 2018 had previously voted for the PML-N in 2013 (2018 Gallup Exit Poll).

In the 2018 general election, twelve religious political parties collectively received 5.21 million votes, which is equivalent to 9.8% of the total vote share. In the provinces, they garnered 19.4% of the vote in KP and 16.7% in Balochistan. Punjab had the highest number of votes for religious parties at 2.7 million, but this represented only 8% of the province's electorate. In Sindh, religious parties received 1.1 million votes, slightly more than in Punjab, accounting for 11% of the vote there.

The MMA alliance, led by JI and JUI-F, joined forces for the elections and secured approximately 2.6 million votes, equivalent to 4.85% of the total vote share. They managed to win 12 seats in the National Assembly and one seat each in the Sindh Assembly, Balochistan Assembly and KP Assembly. In terms of overall votes, religious parties received 45,388,404 votes in the 2013 elections and 52,982,101 votes in the 2018 elections. (Hussain and Saleem, 2018).

Table: 6 Electoral Comparison of Religious Parties in 2013 and 2018 Elections

Sr. No.	Religious Parties	2013	2018
1	Muttahida Majlis-e Amal (MMA)	--	12
2	Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI-F)	15	--
3	Jamaat-e-Islami (JI)	4	--
4	Mutahida Deeni Mahaz	0	--
5	Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam Nazryati (JUI-N)	0	0
6	Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan (JUP)	0	--
7	Sunni Ittehad Council	0	0
8	Sunni Tehreek	0	0
9	Tehreek-e-Labbaik Islam	--	0
10	Tehreek-e-Labbaik Islam	--	0
11	Pakistan Rah-e-Haq Party	--	0
12	Tehreek-e-Labbaik Islam	--	0
13	Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam Pakistan (Noorani)	--	0
14	Majlis-e-Wahdat-e-Muslimeen Pak	0	0
15	Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam Pakistan (S)	0	0

Source: ISAS Insights Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore.

5.3 Electoral Comparison of JI and JUI-F in 2013 Election

In the 2013 general elections, both JI and JUI-F ran separately and had their main support in KPK, Balochistan and FATA. JI won only three seats in KPK, one of which was for a woman and didn't perform well in other parts of the country. JUI-F, on the other hand, did better in

KPK, Balochistan and FATA, securing a total of thirteen seats, including seats for women and a non-Muslim. However, neither party won in Punjab or Sindh and overall, JI had a weaker electoral performance compared to JUI-F. It's worth noting that no other religious party made a significant impact in the 2013 elections.

Table: 7 Comparison of JI and JUI-F in 2013 Elections

Party	Punjab	Sindh	KPK	Balochistan	FATA	Reserved		Total
						Women	Non-Muslim	
JI	00	00	03	00	00	01	00	04
JUI-F	00	00	04	04	01	02+01	01	13

Source: Prepared by the Researcher based on the data from ECP website

5.4 Electoral Analysis of MMA in 2018 Election

JI and JUI-F were the major constituents of MMA, a coalition of six religious parties formed in 2002. Among other parties were JUP, TJP, JAH and JUI (Sami ul Haq). This coalition won 11.3 % of the vote in the 2002 general elections and established the KP government.

By the time of the 2008 elections, this coalition had disintegrated, mostly due to

considerable differences between the two main political parties in the alliance, JI and JUI-F. JI chose not to vote and MMA quickly lost the support it had gained. PML-N and PPPP once again received the majority of the vote in the nation, but just 2.1% of the vote overall. In the general elections of 2013, JI and JUI-F competed separately, but in the elections of 2018, both parties participated in the MMA—a coalition of five religious parties, including JI, JUI-F, JUI-S, JUP and Tehreek-a-Islam—along

with other religious groups. Working together once more, the JI and JUI-F-led alliance was able to secure 4.85 % of the vote, or roughly 2.6 million votes.

In the National Assembly, the MMA is the only religious party to have secured representation with 12 MPs. Additionally, it was successful in winning one seat each in the KP, Balochistan and Sindh assemblies. MMA's political backing has waned over time. As an illustration, in the elections of 2002, it received 3.3 million votes and 63 seats in the National Assembly. JI and JUI-F each received 963,903 and 1,461,371 votes in their respective constituencies, respectively and 19 seats in the 2013 elections. The Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam Nazrayati, an established religious institution, also perished. It received 34,170 votes as opposed to the 103,098 that were cast in the 2013 election. The electoral success of Islamic political parties in Pakistan makes it plainly clear that, although having a strong local following, they have not yet been able to convert that support into electoral power.

Conclusion

The overall voter turnout in the general elections of 2013 was 55.02 %, however it decreased to 51.7 % in the elections of 2018, compared to elections since the 1980s. Religious political parties, which earned 10% of the total votes cast, generally received more support than in the 2013 election. Due to the MMA, being inactive since 2008, religio-political parties contested the 2013 election separately. Although JUI-F made a fruitless attempt to revive it in 2012, JI refused to join it. JI contested alone in the 2013 elections, but it was only able to gain three seats in the National Assembly and had similarly poor results in the provinces. Under the MMA umbrella, religious political parties contested the 2018 elections and received 2.54 million votes nationwide. As compared to JUI-F, the MMA's major religious party, JI did not fare well in the election.

It is hard to estimate the future of Pakistan's religio-political parties, JI and JUI-F,

due to a variety of variables. In recent elections, JI, has failed to compete with bigger parties like PTI and PML-N. Its future depends on expanding appeal, forging partnerships and adjusting to shifting political conditions. JUI-F is allied with conservative religious organizations and is popular in provinces like KP and Balochistan. Its performance in 2018 was inconsistent as it did well in some provinces but not others. Maintaining support in strongholds, forming alliances and enlisting the support of its religious base are all necessary for its survival. Politics-related factors, partnerships, resolving the issues of key supporters and efficient communication are important.

Their futures are also influenced by political developments, leadership shifts and key players' performances. Making precise projections is difficult due to Pakistan's changing political environment, which is influenced by economy, security, and public opinion. In short, these parties' prospects depend on their capacity to adapt, forge alliances and function in Pakistan's ever-changing political environment.

References

- Abbas, H. (2014). *The Taliban Revival: Violence and Extremism on the Pakistan-Afghanistan Frontier*. Yale University Press. ISBN 9780300178845.
- Aziz, K.K., (1967). *The Making of Pakistan: A Study in Nationalism*. Sang-e- Meel Publication, Lahore.
- Downs, Anthony (1957). *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. New York: Harper. ISBN 978-0-06-041750-5.
- Gallup, (2018). Gallup Exit Poll. FAFEN's Analysis of Voter Turnout in GE-2018. (2018, August 12). Retrieved from <https://fafen.org/fafens-analysis-of-voter-turnout-in-ge-2018/>
- Hassain, R. & Saleem, F., (2018). *The Performance of Religious Parties in Pakistan's Elections*. Institute of South

- Asian Studies, National University of Singapore.
- Jaffrelot, C., (2012). *Secularization without Secularism in Pakistan*. Paris: Sciences Po.
- Jahangir, R. (2018). Religious Parties Clinch Over 9% Share of Votes in National Assembly. Dawn newspaper, August 1, 2018.
- JUI-F announces 12-point manifesto, (2013 April 15). Dawn
- Khan, Z.A., (2013). Iqbal and Quaid's Vision of Pakistan the Dialogue Volume V Number 2 <http://qurtuba.edu.pk>thedialogue>Dialogue>
- Krishnan, A. (2013). *Pakistan Elections 2013: Declining Support for Religious Parties*. Islamabad: Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, IPCS.
- Lijphart, A. (1971). Comparative politics and the comparative method. *American Political Science Review*, 65(3), 682–693. doi: 10.2307/1955513
- Mehmood, W., (2018). *Consensual and Conflictual Political Culture in Pakistan: A comparative Analysis of Jamaat-i- Islami & Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam Socialization Process* (Thesis). University of Peshawar, Peshawar.
- Misra, A. (2003). *Rise of Religious Parties in Pakistan: Causes and Prospects Strategic Analysis: A Monthly Journal of the IDSA April-June 2003* (Vol. XXVII No. 2)
- Nine-party IJI emerges. (2013, April 29). The Express Tribunes.
<https://tribune.com.pk/story/541881/election-ary-nine-party-iji-emerges>
- Roy, Olivier (1994). *The Failure of Political Islam*. Harvard University Press. pp.88 ISBN 9780674291409a.
- Talbot, I. (2009). *The Partition of India*. Cambridge University Press.
p. 36. ISBN 978-0-521- 85661-4.